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Throughout economic history, the global economy has experienced recurring crises. The 
persistent recurrence of such economic crises calls for an understanding of their generic 
features rather than treating them as singular events. Global economic system is a highly 
complex system and can best be viewed in terms of a network of interacting macroeconomic 
agents. In this regard, from the perspective of collective network dynamics, here we explore 
how the topology of global macroeconomic network affects the patterns of spreading of 
economic crises. Using a simple toy model of crisis spreading, we demonstrate that an 
individual country’s role in crisis spreading is not only dependent on its gross macroeconomic 
capacities, but also on its local and global connectivity profile in the context of the world 
economic network. We find that on one hand clustering of weak links at the regional scale can 
significantly aggravate the spread of crises, but on the other hand the current network 
structure at the global scale harbors higher tolerance of extreme crises compared to more 
“globalized” random networks. These results suggest that there can be a potential hidden cost 
in the ongoing globalization movement towards establishing less-constrained, trans-regional 
economic links between countries, by increasing vulnerability of the global economic system 
to extreme crises. 
 
2 
Introduction 
Historic events, from the Great Depression and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system to the 
more recent Asian financial crisis and the current economic turmoil triggered by the United States 
housing market, are only some of the dramatic episodes in the chronicle of global economic crises 
[1]. Economic crises are diverse in scale and detail, and recur intermittently yet persistently. 
Researchers in political economy and international relations have devoted this problem for many 
years [2]. The persistent recurrence of economic crises despite great economic and political efforts 
to prevent them suggests that they might be a generic rather than singular part of the global 
economic dynamics [3, 4], and there might be a general pattern beyond episode-specific particulars. 
Underlying this rationale is the idea that the global economic system is a highly interlinked and 
interactive many-body complex system comprised of heterogeneous entities (countries) with 
intricate interdependencies [5]. Along this line, here we address this problem in a quantitative 
setting using tools and concepts from network science and viewing the global economic crisis from 
the perspective of collective network dynamics [6-8]. 
 From the spreading of infectious diseases [9] to political opinions [10], the substrate 
structure over which pathogens or opinions are transmitted plays a crucial role in determining the 
large-scale pattern of spreading dynamics [8, 11]. In the global economic system, countries and 
other economic institutions are connected through various economic channels ranging from 
commodity and capital trading to political and administrative partnerships. Changes in a country’s 
economic conditions can spread through these connection channels in diverse ways, either by 
directly inducing supply/demand imbalance and liquidity risk or by indirectly affecting the 
comparative advantage and mutual credit landscapes [12]. Accordingly, connectivity patterns of the 
global economic system can impose structural constraints on the dynamics of crisis spreading.  
Network properties of the global economic system have been documented in many studies, 
which have revealed scale-free weighted topology at various levels [13-16], increasing connectivity 
over time [17-20], and implications for economic development [21, 22]. However, much less is 
known about how such structural properties could translate into or form constraints on dynamic 
processes occurring in the global economic system, especially with respect to crisis spreading. In 
this study we attempt to fill this gap by establishing a general picture upon which more specific and 
context-dependent situations can be studied and understood. 
 
 
3 
Materials and Methods 
The global macroeconomic network 
Different connection channels in the global economic system, such as commodity trading and 
administrative partnerships, may possess distinct structural profiles and dynamic response 
characteristics depending on various economic and political constraints. To model crisis spreading 
in complete detail, every economic channel should be incorporated individually. It is, however, 
neither possible nor necessary to do that in our study because our main goal is to build a general 
picture and illustrate key features that are less dependent on microscopic details, using the 
philosophy of critical phenomena in statistical physics. Different economic channels, despite their 
diversity, are not completely independent of one another, as they are under a common economic 
and political environment to some extent [23]. It has long been argued that among the diverse 
channels the trading relationships represent the most direct and consequential economic 
interdependency between countries [24, 25]. From a practical viewpoint, international trading has 
been most comprehensively and transparently documented by official agencies for many years. 
Therefore, we used international trade data to build the global macroeconomic network (GMN) in 
this study. 
The GDP data was obtained from the International Monetary Fund World Economic 
Outlook Database October 2008 edition 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/weodata/index.aspx). From the database, we used the 
five-year list of each country’s GDP, from the year 2002 to 2006, except for 13 countries with 
limited data for various reasons. Whenever possible, we used a five-year average value for the 
country’s current representative GDP value (in US dollars). Otherwise, we used the average value 
for the available period. 
The trade data was obtained from the United Nations International Merchandise Trade 
Statistics Publication Yearbook 2007 (http://comtrade.un.org/pb/CountryPages.aspx?y=2007). This 
dataset contains for each country, among others, a list of trading partners and corresponding trade 
volumes, both for exports and imports, in the same five-year period from 2002 to 2006. As with the 
GDP, we used five-year average value for the representative trade volume between two countries. 
Otherwise, we used the average value for the available period.  
In order to build GMN, we considered only countries with both the GDP and trade data 
available in our datasets, resulting in 175 countries. The list of 175 countries with their 
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characteristics relevant to this study is tabulated in Table S1. In this way, we have the GMN as a 
directed, node- and link-weighted network of 175 countries. 
 
Crisis spreading model 
From a theoretical perspective, the spread of an economic crisis can be framed as a cascading 
failure or avalanche process [26-30]. Along this line, we introduce a toy model of crisis spreading 
on GMN as follows (Figs. 1 and S1). Each node has its capacity Ci and each link has the weight Wij 
(Fig. 1A). Suppose that a country i collapses (Fig. 1B). As a result, the weights W of all links of 
country i are decreased by a fraction f. If the total decrement ΔW of either the incoming or outgoing 
link weights of any countries connected to the collapsed country exceeds a fraction t of its node 
capacity C, then these countries also collapse (for example, country k in Fig. 1C), thereby 
decreasing their link weights by fraction f and initiating an avalanche of collapses. This in turn can 
cause their neighbors to collapse, and the avalanche proceeds until there are no more newly-
collapsed countries (Fig. 1D). 
Key quantities in the resulting dynamics are the number of subsequently collapsed 
countries starting from a given country’s collapse (hereafter we call this avalanche size A of the 
country), and the distribution of avalanche sizes P(A) over all starting nodes [31]. The avalanche 
size can be used to assess an individual country’s potential impact as the crisis epicenter. The 
dynamics of the model depends on the parameter ratio f/t. Depending on the value of the reduced 
parameter f/t, the avalanche size distribution P(A) of all countries takes a qualitatively different 
form. When f/t is too small, there is no large avalanche, so P(A) decays rapidly with A. In contrast, 
when f/t is too large, there is an excess of global avalanches giving rise to a finite peak around the 
network-spanning avalanche sizes. In between, there exists a critical point, estimated to be f/t ≈ 7, 
at which P(A) becomes power-law-like and the system exhibits the broadest spectrum of avalanche 
outcomes (Fig. 2). Due to lack of comprehensive records, there is currently no clear empirical 
evidence of the power law in the magnitudes of economic crises. However, many social and 
economic phenomena are known to exhibit such a power-law pattern, such as the size of wars 
measured by the number of casualties [32] and the magnitude of short-term returns of stock market 
indices [33], as well as some natural and technological phenomena such as the magnitude of 
earthquakes [31] and the volume of Internet traffic fluctuations [34]. From a methodological 
viewpoint, the dynamics at the critical parameter provides additional advantage that the avalanche 
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sizes of countries disperse the most, thereby facilitating the clearest comparison between countries. 
Therefore we focused this study on avalanche dynamics at the critical point.  
 
Results 
The GDP of a country cannot fully account for its avalanche size 
One would expect that a country’s avalanche size would relate to a macroeconomic index such as 
the gross domestic product (GDP) [35]. Indeed, the avalanche size roughly scales with GDP, 
especially for large GDP countries (Fig. 3). However, the GDP cannot fully explain avalanche size. 
Specifically, the correlation between them is significant but imperfect: the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient is 0.51 (P-value = 1.07×10-13, t-test). There are outliers deviating from the 
overall trend. For example, Spain has a small avalanche size (A=0) compared with its GDP (997 
billion US dollars) whereas the Republic of South Africa (RSA) has a much larger avalanche size 
(A=8) for its GDP (199 billion US dollars).  
 To facilitate an understanding of the underlying mechanism for these trends and deviations, 
we introduce the trade volume-GDP profile (TGP) for a country, which is a scatter plot of trade 
volume to each trading partner of the country with respect to the partner’s GDP (Figs. 4 and S2). 
For example, the difference between the TGP of Spain and that of RSA is obvious (Figs. 4A and B). 
Spain is a good example of what we call a proportional trader, engaging in more trades with high 
GDP countries and less trades with low GDP countries. On the other hand, the RSA concentrates its 
trade on low-GDP countries that have low capacities, and this brings about the collapse of countries 
located far above the diagonal of the TGP relation (black squares in Fig. 4B). From TGP analysis, it 
can easily be seen that fluctuations in proportional trading in the low GDP regions signify the 
degree of potential direct avalanche impact of a country.  
 
Cascade through weak channels entangles the crisis spreading 
A crisis spreads in cascades, not necessarily limited to direct impact. For some countries such as 
France and Hong Kong (Figs. 4C and D), collapsed countries are not only located above the 
diagonal of the TGP but also in the middle of it, implying the existence of the cascade process. 
Consider a cascade process with the avalanche starting from Hong Kong as an illustrative example 
(Fig. 5). The cascade process involves two operationally different mechanisms. It can proceed 
directly by following successive direct trade channels (via the solid arrows in Fig. 5), or indirectly 
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by following detours (via the dashed arrows in Fig. 5). An indirect cascade propagates through 
weak links, the weight of which is insufficient to transmit the cascade directly. However, when the 
impact through such a weak channel combines with impacts through detours, the aggregate impact 
can be strong enough to transmit the cascade. The weak links have been shown to play an important 
structural role in financial market network [36]. The fundamental unit of such an indirect cascade is 
a triad relation with one strong link and two weak links (highlighted with black arrows in Fig. 5). 
These indirect cascades render the avalanche process nontrivial. Such entangled domino effects can 
also establish invisible links, through which a crisis can spread even to countries that are not 
directly connected to the initiation node. For example, a crisis starting from Hong Kong can reach 
Myanmar, which does not engage in a direct trade relation with Hong Kong (Fig. 5; see Fig. S3 and 
Table S2 for more examples). In this way, a country’s impact on crisis spreading is greatly 
amplified by the local clustering of weak links, as exemplified by the countries in the Southeast 
Asian block, similarly to the accelerated spread of behavioral adoption through clustered social 
networks [37]. 
Such a nontrivial cascade effect accounts for a significant fraction of the avalanche for 
countries with relatively large avalanche sizes. To assess this effect quantitatively, we divided a full 
avalanche process into four sub-processes (Fig. 6): i) A one-step direct avalanche comprised of 
countries that collapse by direct impact from the starting country; ii) a multi-step direct avalanche 
comprised of countries that collapse by direct cascade processes; iii) an indirect avalanche 
comprised of countries that collapse through indirect cascades; and iv) a residual avalanche 
comprised of countries that collapse through impacts from countries in indirect avalanche. For most 
countries with an avalanche size A > 10, the indirect avalanche constitutes more than half of the 
total avalanche (Fig. 6). This clearly shows that crisis spreading might not always propagate 
linearly and could occur in a highly entangled way. Therefore, it is crucial to take the entire 
network into account in order to fully understand the generic feature of the crisis spreading process. 
Country-specific local connectivity patterns can also affect an individual country’s avalanche 
profile. For example, Russia shows a higher fraction of one-step direct avalanches, most of which 
are former members of the Soviet Union with low economic capacities. Hong Kong, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia exhibit higher fractions of multi-step direct avalanches that originate from their strong 
connectivity to Singapore.  
The duration of an avalanche reveals additional aspects of the entangled propagation of 
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crisis spreading. The avalanche duration of a country is defined as the number of cascade steps 
needed for an avalanche process starting from the country to come to an end. In general, larger 
avalanches tend to occur over longer durations, and smaller ones tend to be shorter (Fig. 7). 
However, significant deviations from this simple trend could occur. For example, the RSA has a 
very short duration with respect to its avalanche size. Its impact is entirely confined to its 
immediate South African neighborhood and the avalanche proceeds for only two steps. In contrast, 
countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore have much longer durations of six steps 
compared to other countries with similar avalanche sizes. This behavior is again rooted in strong 
weak-channel clustering prevalent among these Southeast Asian countries, which can support 
complicated pathways with alternating direct and indirect cascades.  
 
Large-scale patterns of crisis spreading 
Characterizing the overall structural properties of the global economic system is necessary to reveal 
the global-scale relation between the network structure and the dynamics of crisis spreading. To this 
end, we built a spanning tree for the GMN comprised of maximum weight links [38]. As shown in 
the spanning tree representation (Fig. 8A and Text S1), the global economic system exhibits 
continental clustering, which has widely been acknowledged in the literature [24, 39]. In addition, 
we built what we call the avalanche network, in which two countries are connected by a directed 
link if a country can make the other country collapse, resulting in 367 directed links connecting 175 
countries (Fig. 8B; see Fig. S4 for a more detailed map with annotations). In the avalanche network, 
12 countries, such as Bhutan and Solomon Islands, are isolated. These countries are effectively 
economically isolated and engage in very limited trade with the outside, so they neither cause other 
countries to collapse nor collapse due to other countries. As expected, the overall aspect of 
avalanche relations dictated by the avalanche network followed the continental clustering structure 
of the GMN. To assess the degree of continental clustering at the GMN and the avalanche network 
structures, we calculated the fraction of links connecting countries within the same continent 
(colored links in Fig. 8). In the spanning tree of the GMN, 97 out of 174 links (56%) are intra-
continental links. In the avalanche network, 150 out of 367 links (41%) are intra-continental links. 
As we will show, these fractions are significantly high, quantitatively confirming the presence of 
continental clustering. This continental clustering property enabled us to build a coarse-grained 
avalanche network at the continental level, revealing the major flow of influence and dominance 
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over different continental regions (Fig. S5). We note that the large-scale pattern in the continental 
avalanche network resembles the map of information flow based on the causal relations between 
stock market indices described in [40], indicating that both product exchange and information flow 
between markets commonly reflect their economic interdependency.  
 
Comparison with randomized network structures  
To further investigate the effect of the network structure of the global economic system on crisis 
spreading dynamics, we introduced two randomized networks and studied their crisis spreading 
characteristics against that of the GMN. First, we built a globally-shuffled network (GSN) in the 
following way: i) Choose two links randomly. ii) Consider swapping the trade partners of the two 
links. iii) If the changes of both new links’ weights from the original links’ weights in the GMN are 
less than 1%, accept the exchange. Otherwise the exchange is not accepted and restored. iv) Repeat 
i)-iii) until the stationary state was reached (see Text S1 and Fig. S6 for more details). An important 
point is to refer the original link weight rather than the current weight for testing the exchange 
acceptance criterion to prevent the accumulated changes of link weights that may distort a country’s 
trading profile undesirably. Using this randomization approach, we were able to shuffle each 
country’s trading partners randomly while maintaining the number of links and trade volumes of 
each link of each country. This randomization has the effect of untangling the continental clustering. 
Indeed, the spanning tree of the GSN (Fig. 8C) typically contained only 35±3 (mean ± standard 
deviation) intra-continental links (20%), a significant reduction in continental clustering by more 
than one-half (empirical P-value < 10-3). The reduction of continental clustering was also found in 
the avalanche network over the GSN (Fig. 8D), in which only 80±3 out of 608±18 links (13%) 
were intra-continental links; again, a highly significant decrease by more than one-half compared to 
the GMN (empirical P-value < 10-3).  
The untangling of continental clustering in the GSN had the significant effect of increasing 
the overall degree of crisis spreading. In the GSN, the sum of avalanche sizes of all countries was 
608±18, significantly larger than the sum 356 in the GMN (empirical P-value < 10-3). The origin of 
this enhanced crisis spreading is that due to the untangling of continental clustering, the failure of 
major countries could spread farther and more broadly than in the GMN. Reflecting this, developed 
countries such as the United States, Germany, Japan, China, and France exhibited considerably 
larger avalanche sizes in the GSN than in the GMN, which dominantly accounted for the increased 
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sum of overall avalanche sizes (Figs. 9A, 9B, and 10A). On the other hand, many countries had 
their avalanche sizes reduced in the GSN, such as Hong Kong and Malaysia, and some countries 
completely lost their spreading ability, such as the RSA (Fig. 10A). Most of avalanche size changes, 
both the increase and the decrease, are accounted for by the indirect avalanche (Fig. S7). This 
means that the nontrivial effect of the local connectivity structure was almost disentangled in the 
randomized networks, and the avalanche dynamics became simplified for most countries. Only 
when the gross impact of a country exceeded a threshold did crisis spreading through indirect 
avalanche occur and dominate. In this sense, the rich-get-richer and the poor-get-poorer aspects 
became more severe in the GSN.  
Polarization of impact was further intensified in the second version of our randomized 
network−the so-called globally-distributed network (GDN). In the GDN, each country can have as 
many trading partners as is constrained only by the total trade volume. Specifically, we constructed 
a GDN in the following way: i) Discretize and divide each trade link of GMN into unit links in one 
million US dollars. ii) Start from the network with all the unit in- and out-links unlinked. iii) Select 
one export unit and one import unit from the unlinked unit links. iv) If the export and the import 
countries are different, connect the two by an arrow. Otherwise, discard the trial. v) Repeat iii)-iv) 
until all unit links are connected. v) Merge unit links with same export and import countries, 
restoring the weighted network structure. In the hypothetical globalized world represented by a 
GDN, the avalanche size distribution becomes even more polarized. In the GDN, only three 
countries−United States, Germany, and China−have dominant avalanche sizes (Fig. 9C). Yet, the 
average avalanche size of these three countries is 132, spanning as much as 75% of the globe (Fig. 
10B).  
To quantify the degree of polarization in the avalanche impact for different network 
structures, we calculated two quantities: the typical size, and the likelihood of nonzero avalanches. 
The former is given by the average of avalanche sizes over countries with nonzero avalanche sizes 
and describes the expected global impact that the global economic system might suffer once the 
avalanche occurs. The latter is given by the number of countries with nonzero avalanche sizes 
divided by the total number of countries, providing a measure of how likely an avalanche is to 
occur when crises are initiated randomly. Both randomized networks have a higher typical size, 
20±1.8 for the GSN (empirical P-value < 10-3) and 132±11.0 for the GDN (empirical P-value < 10-
3), compared to 9.7 for the GMN (Fig. 10B). The finding that spreading of crisis becomes larger for 
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random networks is consistent with the results from a recent modeling study based on epidemic 
spreading [41]. On the other hand, they have a lower likelihood, 0.18±0.015 for the GSN (empirical 
P-value = 0.007) and 0.017±0.002 for GDN (empirical P-value < 10-3), compared to 0.22 for the 
GMN. This means that crisis spreading might take place less often in randomized economic 
systems, but once it occurs, its impact would be far more extensive and widespread than it is now in 
the GMN. Underlying this robust-yet-fragile property is the dual role of big countries: On one hand, 
they act as shock absorbers by tolerating and buffering impacts from most countries’ collapse with 
their large reservoir of economic capacities and alternative connection channels [28]. At the same 
time, they are also the Achilles’ heel [42] of the global economic system in the sense that their 
failure would trigger the spreading of a worldwide crisis, leading to an almost complete failure of 
the global economic system. From the network topological perspective, the randomized structures 
(the GSN and the GDN) possess elevated degrees of a rich-club effect [43] compared to the GMN 
through the disentanglement of continental clustering (Fig. S8). Such enhancement of mutual 
linkage between large economies in the randomized structures therefore may in part be responsible 
for the changes in the crisis spreading property. This double-faceted picture emerging from the 
crisis spreading dynamics of the global economic system can be a starting point from which more 
reasonable international relations development scenario based on cascade control [44] and 
optimization for network resilience [45] under crisis spreading can be formulated.   
 
Robustness of the model results 
The specific outcomes of avalanche dynamics may well depend on the fine-scale structure of 
network linkages and the mechanistic details of the crisis spreading process, modulated by episode-
specific environmental factors. Our toy model of crisis spreading may have neglected many 
potentially important factors in crisis spreading dynamics. Therefore, it is important to confirm the 
robustness of the general features under economically reasonable modification of the model’s 
details. Here we will present one such modification of the model. Results of other modifications are 
deferred to Supporting Information. Tolerance to crisis of a country may be dependent also on the 
fiscal conditions of the country that are not directly reflected in the GDP. For example the current 
account balance (CAB) of the country may be a simple indicator of its macroeconomic fiscal 
soundness. We incorporated CAB to the model dynamics for investigating the robustness of the 
main conclusions. To this end, we modified the economic capacity of each country to be the sum of 
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its GDP and CAB, such that countries with positive (negative) CAB will tolerate the impact from 
crisis to a larger (lesser) extent. We obtained the CAB data from the International Monetary Fund 
World Economic Outlook Database, from which we also obtained the GDP data. Under these 
modification, the resulting overall feature of the model dynamics is similar to that of the original 
model (Fig. 11): the power-law-like avalanche size distribution is obtained around f/t ≈ 7 (Fig. 
11A); the avalanche profile exhibits large portions of indirect avalanches (Fig. 11B); and there are 
significant intra-continental linkages, that is 146 out of 519 links (28%) in the avalanche networks 
(Fig. 11C).  
We have tried a number of other modifications, including link and node weight rescaling, 
different cascading rules, and taking other country-specific fiscal conditions into account (Text S1, 
Figs. S9 and S10). Under all these modifications, we confirmed that the overall patterns of the 
crisis spreading dynamics described in this study remained unaltered. Furthermore, these overall 
patterns were robustly and consistently obtained for a wide range of the model parameter 3 < f/t < 
20 (Text S1 and Figs. S11-S14). Therefore, the global pattern of crisis spreading dynamics obtained 
in the study is likely robust and generic. There are still missing components in our modeling; 
additions of other economic channels, such as the financial links which are thought to be a major 
origin of the current turmoil, would result in a better episode-specfic explanation of the sequence of 
crisis spreading dynamics. They are, however, not expected to alter the overall avalanche properties 
qualitatively either, as long as they do not completely change global network characteristics such as 
regional and continental clustering. Therefore, even though the global economic system will 
inevitably undergo structural and environmental changes over time, we expect that the general 
framework and conclusions established in this study will be relevant to the systemic investigations 
of global economic problems.  
 
Discussion  
We have studied the crisis spreading dynamics on global economic system using a simple toy 
model of crisis spreading on top of the global macroeconomic network built from the international 
trade data. Focusing on the role of the network topology at the local and global level, we have 
shown that the impact of a country to the spread of crisis is not fully captured by its simple 
macroeconomic index such as GDP, but its connectivity profile is also instrumental for a better 
understanding. Beyond the direct impact, the indirect impacts propagating through weak links form 
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a significant part of the avalanche process of crisis spreading. At the local or regional scale, we 
have shown that the strong regional blocs leading to clustering of weak links can aggravate the 
crisis spreading, by accumulating impact through the dense multilateral connectivity within the 
blocs. At the same time, on the global scale, the current structure of global macroeconomic network 
harbors higher tolerance to extreme crises than the more “globalized” network structures obtained 
by randomized global networks. These results may have an interesting implication on the hidden 
cost of the ongoing globalization movement: In a more globalized macroeconomic network in 
which the regional and continental clustering continues to become untangled via establishing free 
trade agreements transcending regional blocs, a crisis would propagate throughout the world 
economy more easily, and therefore the global economy would become more susceptible to 
extreme crises and potentially an unprecedented level of world-wide depression. 
It is now widely accepted that a systems or a network view is essential for a better 
understanding of global economic challenges [46, 47]. The increasing availability of various data at 
the global scale, and tools and insights from network science with which to analyze them, provide 
an opportunity to transform this conceptual necessity into a quantitative possibility. The network 
dynamics approach undertaken here has demonstrated utility and promise, offering a general 
picture of crisis spreading dynamics at the global network level and at the individual country level. 
We hope that our simple model and analysis trigger the interest of researchers from diverse 
disciplines, including international economics and finance, systems and ecological engineering, and 
the physical and mathematical sciences, thereby helping them cooperate to better understand and 
improve the global economic system.  
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Figure 1. Crisis spreading model. The dynamics of the crisis spreading model proceeds as 
follows: (A) Each node (country) is assigned a capacity C given by its GDP value, and two 
countries i and j are connected by a directed link given by the trade relation with the associated 
weight Wij given by the corresponding trade volume. (B) Suppose that a country i collapses 
(indicated as dark brown). Then the weights of all links of country i (indicated as brown) are 
decreased by a fraction of f. And the total decrement ΔW of either the incoming or outgoing link 
weights of any countries connected to the collapsed country is compared with the fraction t of its 
node capacity. (C) If the total decrement exceeds the threshold for any countries, these countries 
also collapse (country k, in this example), triggering an avalanche of collapses. The link weights of 
newly-collapsed countries are decreased by the fraction f, and total decrement ΔW of each country 
is re-evaluated. (D) This process continues until there are no more newly-collapsed countries. 
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Figure 2. Avalanche size distributions. The cumulative counts of countries with avalanche sizes 
equal to or greater than A, which behaves in the same way as the cumulative distribution of P(A), is 
plotted. At the critical parameter f/t=7, the plot becomes straight with a slope of -1 (dashed line) on 
a logarithmic scale, indicating the power-law relation P(A) ~ A-2. The horizontal axis has been 
offset by one, to plot the countries with A=0 on a logarithmic scale. 
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Figure 3. Avalanche size vs. GDP. Scatter plot of the avalanche size of each country offset by one 
(A+1) as a function of its GDP is displayed with the color code by continental association (AF: 
Africa, EA: East Asia, EE: East Europe, ME: Middle-East, NA: North America, SA: South America, 
OC: Oceania, and WE: West Europe). The overall increasing trend with some deviations indicates 
that the avalanche size of a country is partly accounted for by the GDP, but not entirely. The dashed 
box indicates a group of countries with A=0 (split to minimize overlaps to enhance visual 
comprehensibility). Country name codes follow the ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 code throughout the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Figure 4. Trade volume-GDP (TGP) profile. TGP of (A) Spain, (B) the RSA, (C) France, and (D) 
Hong Kong are displayed. Red points denote the countries with lower GDPs than the starting 
country, and blue points in the gray area are those with higher GDPs. The black squares represent 
countries that are collapsed by the starting country. The area shaded in orange denotes the region 
within which countries can be affected directly by the starting country. 
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Figure 5. Full sequence of avalanche process starting from Hong Kong. Direct channels (solid 
arrows) and indirect channels (dashed arrows) are distinguished because they contribute to the 
avalanche process by different mechanisms. Countries are colored according to the sub-process 
they belong to, and their size is given by the GDP (in million US dollars). The starting country, 
Hong Kong, is colored in gray. 
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Figure 6. Avalanche profiles. Bar plot showing the avalanche profile of countries with the ten 
largest avalanche sizes is displayed. The total avalanche process is divided into four sub-processes 
and the colored bar denotes their distribution. For most countries shown in the figure, the indirect 
avalanche (yellow) constitutes the largest fraction of the total avalanche process. 
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Figure 7. Avalanche durations. Relation between avalanche duration and avalanche size for 175 
countries is displayed. Note that some countries have much longer or shorter durations compared to 
their avalanche sizes, thereby deviating from the overall increasing trend. The same color code for 
the continental associations as in Fig. 3 are used. 
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Figure 8. Global patterns of crisis spreading. (A) Spanning tree representation and (B) the 
avalanche network of the GMN are displayed together with (C) the spanning tree and (D) the 
avalanche network of a typical sample of the GSN. The intra-continental links are colored 
according to the color code of the continent and inter-continental links are colored in gray. A more 
detailed version of the avalanche network of (B) is available as Fig. S4. 
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Figure 9. Comparison of avalanche sizes in different network structures. Bar plots of 
avalanche sizes in decreasing order for (A) GMN, (B) GSN, and (C) GDN are displayed. (Inset) 
The same plots in semi-logarithmic scales are displayed. Results for both the GSN and GDN were 
obtained from 103 different randomized networks. Error bars represent the standard deviations over 
these samples. 
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Figure 10. Comparison of crisis spreading in different network structures. (A) Changes in the 
avalanche size for each country in the GSN with respect to that of the GMN. The avalanche size 
increased for the United States, Germany, Japan, China, and France, and decreased for other 
countries. (B) Comparison of typical nonzero avalanche sizes (dark gray) and the likelihoods of an 
avalanche (light gray) for the GMN, GSN, and GDN. Results for both the GSN and GDN were 
obtained from 103 different randomized networks. Error bars represent the standard deviations over 
these samples. 
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Figure 11. Results of the modified crisis spreading model with CAB. Displayed are (A) the 
cumulative counts of avalanche sizes, (B) the avalanche profile of countries with the ten largest 
avalanche sizes, and (C) the avalanche network of the modified model. One may note that 
similarity of the overall results to those of the original model (Figs. 2, 6, and 8B, respectively), 
despite some quantitative changes in the numeric values. In the modified model, we recover the 
power-law-like P(A) at f/t≈7; the indirect avalanches constitute the dominant part of the avalanche 
profiles; and the avalanche network maintains the continental clustering pattern.  
 
 
